Gagasan pelembagaan partai politik kembali mengemuka sebagai agenda penguatan demokrasi Indonesia, hal ini diinisiasi Badan Riset dan Inovasi Nasional (BRIN) melalui pembentukan Indeks Pelambagaan Partai Politik. BRIN berargumen bahwa partai yang semakin terlembaga akan memiliki tata kelola yang lebih baik, kaderisasi yang lebih kuat, serta lebih tahan terhadap dominasi oligarki. BRIN merujuk pada proposisi Randall dan Svasand (2002) yang menyatakan institusionalisasi partai politik akan mendorong konsolidasi demokrasi. Partai semakin terlembaga dilihat melalui empat variabel (Konsistensi penerapan aturan internal, penerapan nilai dan ideologi pada anggota, kemandirian dari intervensi oligarki (aktor eksternal), dan kemampuan mengakar di masyarakat). Ada konteks penting pelembagaan partai politik menurut Randal dan Svasand yang luput diperhatikan oleh BRIN, proses pelembagaan dilaksanakan segera setelah masa transisi, bukan setelah otoritarianisme kembali. Sulit membayangkan bagaimana menempatkan konsep pelembagaan partai dalam konteks sistem kepartaian Indonesia yang telah mengalami konsolidasi elite secara mendalam. Konsekuensinya pelembagaan partai tidak selalu identik dengan pendalaman demokrasi, melainkan berpotensi memperkuat kecenderungan kartelisasi partai politik dan oligarki.
Argumen mengenai pentingnya pelembagaan partai berangkat dari asumsi bahwa partai politik lemah secara organisasi, nir ideologi, berpusat pada figur, bercorak dinasti serta mudah terkooptasi kekuatan oligarki. Sehingga pelembagaan partai diperlukan agar partai lebih kuat untuk berkontribusi pada demokrasi. Namun, konsepsi pelembagaan partai abai terhadap pokok permasalahan utama yaitu kartelisasi pada sistem kepartaian di Indonesia. Merujuk pada Katz dan Mair (1995), bahwa tidak ada keinginan berkompetisi di antara partai politik di Indonesia, kecenderung untuk berbagi kekuasaan, menjaga penguasaan sumber daya negara, berorientasi pada negara ketimbang masyarakat, dan terputusnya keterhubungan dengan masyarakat sipil dalam menyuarakan kepentingan.
Sejalan dengan Katz dan Mair, pendapat Robert Michels (1915) mengenai iron law of oligarchy dalam partai politik perlu menjadi pertimbangan. Michels berpendapat bahwa semakin kompleks dan terorganisasi suatu organisasi politik, semakin besar kecenderungannya untuk dikuasai oleh elite profesional yang memonopoli informasi, sumber daya, dan proses pengambilan keputusan. Dalam konteks Indonesia, pelembagaan yang menekankan disiplin organisasi, penguatan struktur internal, dan sentralisasi kaderisasi justru berpotensi memperkuat dominasi elite partai yang sudah mapan. Alih-alih membuka ruang partisipasi yang lebih luas, proses tersebut dapat mengurangi kemungkinan munculnya kelompok-kelompok pembaharu di dalam organisasi yang mampu menantang status quo hirarki partai.
Partai politik Indonesia saat ini tidak lagi berfungsi sebagai instrumen agregasi kepentingan warga, melainkan lebih banyak beroperasi sebagai perantara antara elite politik, birokrasi negara, dan pemilik modal. Dalam situasi demikian, tuntutan pelembagaan yang hanya berfokus pada penguatan organisasi internal berisiko memperkuat kecenderungan partai menjadi institusi yang tertutup dan eksklusif. Partai menjadi semakin kuat secara administratif, tetapi semakin lemah secara representatif.
Karena itu, agenda reformasi kepartaian seharusnya bukan pada pelembagaan partai, melainkan pada pembukaan ruang kompetisi politik yang lebih luas. Demokrasi membutuhkan regenerasi aktor, gagasan, dan organisasi politik secara terus-menerus. Kartelisasi bisa ditunjukkan melalui indikator antara lain (1) hambatan pendirian partai dan menjadi peserta pemilu dengan syarat yang semakin berat sejak era reformasi ; (2) penerapan ambang batas elektoral yang tinggi; (3) pengaturan syarat mencalonkan presiden; serta (4) berbagai regulasi yang menguntungkan partai mapan yang justru mempersempit peluang lahirnya kekuatan politik baru. Akibatnya, sistem kepartaian bergerak menuju struktur oligopoli yang hanya dihuni oleh aktor-aktor lama dengan kepentingan yang relatif serupa tanpa adanya kompetisi.
Dengan demikian, tantangan demokrasi Indonesia bukanlah bagaimana membuat partai-partai yang ada semakin kuat terlembaga dan bisa mempertahankan eksistensinya, melainkan bagaimana menciptakan ekosistem politik yang memungkinkan munculnya partai-partai baru dan kompetisi yang lebih terbuka. Nancy Rosenblum (2008) menyatakan tujuan utama demokrasi bukan mempertahankan organisasi yang sudah mapan, melainkan menjaga agar konflik politik tetap hidup, terbuka, dan terorganisasi melalui kompetisi yang pluralistik. Dalam konteks itu, kebutuhan mendesak demokrasi Indonesia saat ini bukanlah pelembagaan, melainkan menghadrikan kompetisi politik dan ruang tumbuh bagi partai-partai baru untuk membuat representasi formal menjadi relevan. Selain itu Rosenblum juga menekankan bahwa di berbagai negara demokrasi kekuatan para elit politik justru berhasil mendorong masyarakat untuk anti berpartai dan anti partisan, ini mendorong masyarakat tetap berada pada ranah non-negara dan tidak berintensi masuk dan merebut kekuasaan formal. Kondisi ini yang membuat nyaman partai politik yang semakin terlembaga, mempertahankan status quo, dan mencegah hadirnya partai baru dan mencegah kompetisi. Pertanyaannya apakah pelembagaan partai perlu? Bisakah pelembagaan diintervensi melalui aturan atau pengukuran? Perubahan partai menjadi lebih demokratis dan responsif lebih dimungkinkan jika ada kompetisi.
#Regenerasi #Samsara #Politik
Penulis: Dirga Ardiansa, Peneliti Cakra Wikara Indonesia
English Version:
The idea of political party institutionalization has once again emerged as an agenda for strengthening Indonesian democracy. This initiative has been promoted by Indonesia’s National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN) through the establishment of a Political Party Institutionalization Index. BRIN argues that more institutionalized parties will implement better governance, stronger cadre development, and greater resilience against oligarchic domination. In advancing this argument, BRIN refers to the proposition developed by Randall and Svåsand (2002), which suggests that party institutionalization contributes to democratic consolidation. According to this framework, party institutionalization can be assessed through four dimensions: consistency in the implementation of internal rules, the internalization of party values and ideology among members, autonomy from oligarchic intervention and external actors, and the ability to establish deep roots within society.
However, there is an important aspect of Randall and Svåsand’s conception of party institutionalization that appears to have been overlooked. Their argument was formulated in the context of post-authoritarian democratic transitions, where institutionalization was expected to occur immediately after political liberalization rather than after democratic backsliding or the resurgence of authoritarian tendencies. It is therefore difficult to apply the concept uncritically to Indonesia’s contemporary party system, which has experienced extensive elite consolidation. Under such conditions, party institutionalization cannot automatically be equated with democratic deepening. Instead, it may reinforce tendencies toward party cartelization and oligarchic domination.
The argument for party institutionalization is based on the assumption that political parties are organizationally weak, ideologically hollow, heavily dependent on charismatic figures, dynastic in nature, and vulnerable to oligarchic capture. Consequently, institutionalization is viewed as a means of strengthening parties so that they can contribute more effectively to democracy. Yet this perspective tends to overlook what may be the central problem of Indonesia’s party system: cartelization. Drawing on the work of Katz and Mair (1995), political parties in Indonesia increasingly display limited incentives to compete with one another. Instead, they tend to share power, preserve collective access to state resources, orient themselves toward the state rather than society, and become detached from civil society as a channel for articulating public interests.
In a similar vein, Robert Michels’ (1915) theory of the ‘iron law of oligarchy’ deserves careful consideration. Michels argued that as political organizations become more complex and organized, they are increasingly likely to be dominated by professional elites who monopolize information, resources, and decision-making processes. In the Indonesian context, institutionalization that emphasizes organizational discipline, stronger internal structures, and centralized cadre recruitment may inadvertently reinforce the dominance of already entrenched party elites. Rather than expanding opportunities for participation, such processes may reduce the likelihood that reformist groups within parties can emerge and challenge existing hierarchies and power structures.
Today, Indonesian political parties no longer primarily function as instruments for aggregating citizens’ interests. Instead, they operate largely as intermediaries connecting political elites, state bureaucracies, and economic power holders. In such circumstances, calls for institutionalization that focus exclusively on strengthening internal party organizations risk further transforming parties into closed and exclusive institutions. Parties may become stronger administratively while simultaneously becoming weaker in their representative capacity.
For this reason, the agenda for party reform should not prioritize institutionalization but rather the expansion of political competition. Democracy requires the continuous regeneration of political actors, ideas, and organizations. Cartelization can be observed through several indicators: first, the requirements for establishing political parties and participating in general elections have become increasingly difficult since the Reformation era; second, the implementation of high electoral thresholds; third, requirements for nominating presidential candidates; and fourth, a range of legal provisions that benefit established parties while narrowing opportunities for the emergence of new political forces. As a result, the party system increasingly resembles an oligopolistic structure occupied by long-standing actors with relatively similar interests and limited genuine competition.
Consequently, the central challenge of Indonesian democracy is not how to make existing parties more institutionalized and capable of preserving their organizational survival. Rather, it is how to create a political ecosystem that enables the emergence of new parties and fosters more open competition. Nancy Rosenblum (2008) argues that the primary purpose of democracy is not to preserve established organizations but to ensure that political conflict remains active, open, and organized through pluralistic competition. From this perspective, Indonesia’s most urgent democratic need is not institutionalization but the revitalization of political competition and the creation of opportunities for new parties to make formal representation meaningful once again.
Moreover, Rosenblum emphasizes that in many democracies, the growing power of political elites has contributed to the rise of anti-party and anti-partisan sentiments. This tendency encourages citizens to remain outside formal political institutions and discourages them from seeking or contesting state power. Such conditions ultimately benefit increasingly institutionalized parties, allowing them to maintain the status quo while preventing the emergence of new competitors. This raises a number of important questions: Is party institutionalization truly necessary? Can institutionalization be engineered through regulations and measurement indices? Political parties are more likely to become democratic and responsive when meaningful competition exists. Without competition, institutionalization risks becoming merely another mechanism for preserving existing power structures rather than advancing democratic representation.
#Regeneration #Samsara #Politics
Author: Dirga Ardiansa, Researcher at Cakra Wikara Indonesia